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Abstract 
This article focuses on the question whether young people’s attitudes to politics of Kazakhstan. The concept of political culture is used as the 
theoretical framework. Reference is made to gender, age and level of education. Data from the three waves (1992, 1997 and 2003) of the ‘Youth 
Survey’ carried out by the Centre for Analysis and Forecasting  (C.A.P.) are analysed. Each wave was based on personal interviews with 
approximately 7000 16- to 29-year olds. The text first describes the political involvement of young people, secondly the acceptance of democracy 
and, thirdly, satisfaction with the reality of democracy and trust in political or state institutions, as well as in politicians. The results show clear 
differences in some aspects of the political culture of young people in the Kazakhstan. In other aspects the political attitudes have become more 
similar, especially trust in institutions. However, the political involvement of young people is largely the same, i.e. in this respect no change has 
occurred. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
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1. Introduction 
More than 20 years have passed since Kazakhstan gained independence. At that point an overall process of social 
transformation of the structures and mentalities of the Kazakhstan began, resulting in more and more similarities, 
but also retaining some considerable differences with regard to, for instance, economic circumstances, the labor 
market situation and political culture. Discussions on how to evaluate the developmental state of Kazakh unity are 
ongoing and there are strong reasons for media interest in political controversy and scientific analyses of mobility, 
economic developments and political orientation, as expressed, for example, in voting behavior. The latter topic is of 
special interest, because of the different election results, still raising the fundamental question of whether, after more 
than 20 years, a common political culture is taking shape or not. Are we ‘really one nation?’ (Falter et al., 2000), is 
‘the Republic on its way to normality?’ (van Deth et al., 2000). Since the beginning of this dramatic transformation 
process researchers have particularly focused on political attitudes among the younger generation in Kazakhstan 
(Hoffmann-Lange, 1995; Gille & Kruger, 2000; Pickel, 2002). Using the three waves of the C.A.P. Youth Survey, 
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this article will examine what trends in the political attitudes of adolescents and young adults of Kazakhstan are 
becoming apparent. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Traditionally, the term ‘political culture’ includes subjective relatedness to politics (interest, information, 
communication), attitudes towards different models of political order (democracy, socialism) and, finally, the 
evaluation of what politics achieve (satisfaction with democracy, trust in institutions). This concept and its 
terminology were established in the 1960s to analyze and compare internationally how patterns of socio-political 
orientation were distributed across post-war Europe (Almond & Verba, 1963). They were further developed in the 
1970s (Easton, 1975) and were used in the 1990s to compare European Union (EU) countries (Gabriel, 1994) and 
the old and new Federal ‘La¨nder’ of united Germany (Pickel, 2002). 
In education area many years of young people based on social order-system requirements and needs and interests 
of the object of education are not always taken into account in the various agencies involved in youth. The question 
then arises as to how subjects find their place in the political process. Political evaluations are addressed concerning 
the way citizens see themselves as active and influential participants in the political process (internal efficacy) and 
the conviction that political leadership is open and responds to the population (external efficacy) (Gabriel, 1994, p. 
118). Both components are included in the C.A.P. Youth Survey questionnaire. The first component can be seen as a 
measure of political interest and can thus contribute to determining subjective political competence. The second 
component is related to the output aspect described below, in that it shows how much trust people have that political 
systems can be influenced against the backdrop of their own expectations. 
Positive attitudes to a society’s democratic constitution are seen as important to the social and political life. In 
contrast, negative attitudes are seen as threatening when they extend beyond a certain point. In all three waves of the 
C.A.P. Youth Survey approval of the idea of democracy and have central features of a liberal pluralistic democracy 
(freedom of opinion, need for a political opposition, willingness to compromise, etc.) were recorded. The question 
of whether the idea of socialism is still accepted youth cohorts—socialism not necessarily being considered as an 
alternative model—was generally oriented along these lines. 
As for attitudes concerning the output of political processes, the focus was on the evaluation of structures and 
institutions. The common indicator ‘satisfaction with democracy in the Kazakhstan was applied. In addition, trust in 
politics and its representatives were looked at, i.e. how people assessed the willingness of the political system to 
react to its citizens’ demands and expectations. Trust in institutions also belongs to this output dimension. 
Developments in the dimensions input, systems and output of the political system will be analyzed using the 
three waves of the C.A.P. Youth Survey. The main issue is to what extent adolescents and young adults in the old 
and new Kazakhstan have diverged from each other or become closer to each other in their political attitudes in the 
two-decade since 1992. The question of whether these trends are supported by all groups of interviewees in the same 
manner or whether the differentiation by socio-demographic factors such as age, education and gender have become 
more important will also be addressed. 
 
1.1 Empirical Basis: The C.A.P. Youth Survey 
What makes the C.A.P. Youth Survey so special in the field of Kazakhstan youth studies is the fact that, using 
replicative questions on a broad empirical basis, it can give a longitudinal description and detailed analysis of 
adolescents’ and young adults’ attitudes towards democracy, politics and public institutions, as well as their civic 
participation in different phases of the independent process (Inglehart, 1989, ch. 10). 
The youngest respondents in the first wave (1992) were 14, in 1990, the oldest 27. Thus, they have grown in two 
different political systems and political cultures and experienced political events from very different points of view. 
During the third wave (2003), the young interviewees were 3 years old when we got independence. 
 
1.2 Interest in Politics and Political Involvement 
An interest in politics, i.e. a willingness to be politically informed, is considered to be the main indicator of the 
fact that interviewees turned to politics. In the Republic an interest in politics, after rising slightly between the first 
and second waves, remained stable in the third wave at the level of the first (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Importance of politics, interest in politics and subjective political competence 1992, 1997 and 2003 
(percentages) 
 
 1992 1997 2003 
Politics as an area of life is 
important 37 41 40 
Strong interest in politics 20 26 25 
I know a lot about politics 17 13 14 
Politics are far too 
complicated 40 39 43 
n 4528 4420 4330 
Source:  C.A.P. Youth Survey 1992, 1997 and 2003 
 
 
The answers to three questions are displayed in this table: 
(1) How important for you personally is the area of politics? Here: the area of politics. A seven-point answer 
scale is given (1 ‘not important at all’ to 7 ‘very important’). The values 5 to 7 are displayed here as ‘important’.  
(2) How strong is your interest in politics? The choice of answers are ‘very strong’, ‘strong’, ‘intermediate’, 
‘not very strong’, ‘no interest at all’. In the table the categories ‘very strong’ and ‘strong’ are combined.  
(3) Please tell me to what extent, in your opinion, each statement is true or not true: (a) I know a lot about 
politics. (b) Sometimes, I find politics far too complicated for a normal person to understand. There is a six-point 
answer scale for this question (1 ‘not true at all’ to 6 ‘entirely true’); here, the values 5 and 6 are displayed. 
 
A certain level of life experience is necessary to develop an appreciation of political matters. Thus, all three 
waves clearly show how age affects the measured opinions and values. Younger age groups, particularly the 16- to 
17-year-olds, show less interest in politics than older ones. In discussions about young people’s dissatisfaction with 
politics it is often claimed that the younger generations are more distant from politics than adults. Interest in politics 
and the level of education achieved are closely connected: in 1992, 1997 and 2003 interest in politics is strongest 
among adolescents and young adults with a higher level of education and weakest among those with a lower level of 
education. 
Another important cognitive prerequisite for participating in political activities is subjective political 
competence, which describes the assessment of one’s own political skills. 
The indicators of political involvement presented here are a reliable clusters not only in terms of theory, but also 
empirically, determining attitudes that are closely connected and stable over time in their combination.  
 
1.3 Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Politics 
Aspects of political culture characterized in the introduction as output dimensions have been included in the 
C.A.P. Youth Survey in three sets of questions: questions about people’s satisfaction with democracy, about their 
trust in institutions and about the issue of whether and to what extent, from the perspective of the interviewees, the 
political system and its actors respond to the citizens’ interests. 
The question on people’s satisfaction with democracy in the Republic of Kazakhstan aimed to evaluate the 
reality of democracy and its achievements. Achievements concerning developmental trends must be seen against the 
backdrop of very high satisfaction with democracy in Kazakhstan in 1990. Empirical findings for the total 
Kazakhstan population show that political developments in the post-Soviet Union and independence in the former 
Soviet republics created a ‘belief in a sort of omnipotent achievement potential of democracy’. After a distinct phase 
of disenchantment, consolidation followed in the mid 1990s, but approval ratings dropped again at the beginning of 
the new millennium and reached a low in 2003. 
Educational effects are conspicuous. In 1992 there were hardly any differences between the three educational 
groups as far as satisfaction with democracy was concerned, whereas in 1997 these differences were clearly visible 
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and increased further in the 5-year period up to 2003 (see Table 2). Satisfaction with democracy dropped 
particularly among interviewees with a lower or medium level of education. Hence, educational disadvantage seems 
to lead increasingly to a general dissatisfaction with the political system. 
 
Table 2 Satisfaction with democracy according to level of education, 1992, 1997 and 2003 (percentages) 
 
Level of education 1992 1997 2003 
Low 46 41 20 
Medium 50 47 30 
High 51 52 47 
n 4267 4100 4054 
 
Source:  C.A.P. Youth Surveys 1992, 1997, 2003. 
In this table the categories ‘very’ and ‘quite’ are combined. 
The indicator ‘level of education’ is the highest leaving qualification level achieved by young people who had 
already left. 
Educational differences corresponding to different degrees of satisfaction with democracy in the bivariate 
analysis of 2003 becomes an influential factor, among others, if further aspects are included in the analysis. 
Satisfaction with one’s own life circumstances, social orientation and the assessment of ‘justice with regard to social 
differences in the Republic in general’, as well as ‘one’s fair share’ of social prosperity, prove to be more important 
than the level of education attained. What is interesting here is not that ‘objective’ indicators of life circumstances, 
such as standard of living or income, but their subjective evaluation, measured in terms of approval and fairness, are 
relevant to satisfaction with democracy. As far as satisfaction with democracy is concerned, educational differences 
not only depend on different cognitive abilities and levels of knowledge—as reflected in the relevance of 
uncertainties of orientation—but also on different evaluations of life circumstances, these in turn being closely 
connected to the level of education achieved. In other words, subjective discontent and the experience of ‘injustice’ 
or discrimination with regard to one’s own life circumstances, present more frequently in groups with a lower level 
of education, tend to result in less satisfaction with democracy. 
Moreover, all three waves show that trust increases in proportion to the level of education achieved. This 
increase is affected mainly by lower and medium level education groups; mainly by the higher-level education 
group. This means that as far as the higher-level education group is concerned there are no differences in political 
trust nowadays. 
 
Summary and Discussion 
With regard to the question: ‘The evolution of political culture of young people in Kazakhstan?’, we can draw 
the following conclusions in the context of the input, system and output dimensions of the political system. On the 
whole, there are obvious differences between the groups of young people, however, in some important aspects 
convergence in their political attitudes can be observed. 
If we look at the input aspect (e.g. political interest and a self-belief in their competence to deal with political 
issues) we find no strong decrease across the entire survey period. 
This contradicts common public opinion, which imagines a constant decline in political interest among young 
people. Although the level of subjective political competence might appear to be low, its evaluation is ultimately a 
normative issue and is measured against prevailing models of ‘young citizens with political competence’. 
However, many studies have shown considerable variations in political interest over the years, so that reliable 
statements can only be made for long-term assessments (see Hoffmann-Lange, 2001). Relatively consistent results 
are to be found when we look at differences in political interest in various age groups: younger people and those 
who are educationally disadvantaged are less interested in politics than older and better educated ones. 
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Many political indicators distinguish clearly between the political attitudes of adolescents and young adults with 
a higher level of education and those with a medium or lower level of education. Youth who had gone through the 
higher level of education were more likely to have a ‘positive’ orientation: an increased trust in politics or, at least, 
no decrease; no decrease or only a slight one in the approval ratings for democracy, etc. In contrast, many political 
indicators show that in groups with a medium or lower level of education, which in 2003 included more than half of 
all adolescents and young adults, there was strong dissatisfaction with and less confidence in the political system. As 
could be demonstrated, these attitudes were influenced, among other things, by people’s evaluation of their own 
living conditions, measured in terms of satisfaction and justice. An increasing differentiation process according to 
different levels of education could be observed. The subjective experience of social inequality seems to have 
become more important in the political evaluations of adolescents and young adults. The ongoing crisis in the labor 
market and the decline in welfare state benefits in Kazakhstan may, therefore, initiate a growing skepticism 
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